基于Stackelberg博弈的鋼鐵企業余熱余壓發電的上網電價策略

張朝; 張欣欣

doi:10.13374/j.issn2095-9389.2022.03.20.003

基于Stackelberg博弈的鋼鐵企業余熱余壓發電的上網電價策略

doi: 10.13374/j.issn2095-9389.2022.03.20.003

張朝¹,
張欣欣^{1, 2, ,}

1.
北京科技大學能源與環境學院，北京 100083
2.
北京科技大學冶金工業節能減排北京市重點實驗室，北京 100083

詳細信息

通訊作者:
E-mail: xxzhang@ustb.edu.cn

中圖分類號: F407.3;TK9
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- 文章訪問數: 307
- HTML全文瀏覽量: 80
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- 被引次數: 0
出版歷程
- 收稿日期: 2022-03-20
- 網絡出版日期: 2022-09-23
- 刊出日期: 2023-04-01

Feed-in tariff strategy of waste heat and residual pressure power generation in steel enterprises based on the Stackelberg game

ZHANG Chao¹,
ZHANG Xin-xin^{1, 2
, ,}

1.
School of China Energy and Environmental Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China
2.
Beijing Key Laboratory of Energy Saving and Emission Reduction for Metallurgical Industry, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China

More Information

Corresponding author: E-mail: xxzhang@ustb.edu.cn

摘要

摘要: 研究鋼鐵行業余熱余壓發電與傳統火力發電組成的電力市場，分析鋼鐵企業余熱余壓發電上網電價策略。建立了有關鋼鐵企業、傳統化石燃料發電企業和地方政府三方的斯坦克爾伯格博弈（Stackelberg）模型，比較余熱余壓發電技術上網電價的三種定價策略（固定價格、固定溢價和可變溢價），并進行了數值模擬分析市場規模、余熱余壓發電成本系數和鋼鐵企業環境成本對最優規制價格、最優鋼鐵企業利潤和最優社會總福利的影響。結果表明：三種定價策略下最優規制價格、最優鋼鐵企業利潤和最優社會總福利差異非常大。不同偏好的政策制定者會從不同的風險性和補貼選擇不同的定價策略。其中，風險性大和補貼高是最優規則價格中的可變溢價策略、最優鋼鐵企業利潤中的固定溢價策略和最優社會總福利中的可變溢價策略；風險性低和補貼低是最優規則價格中的固定價格策略、最優鋼鐵企業利潤中的固定價格策略和最優社會總福利中的固定溢價策略；其他情形的風險性和補貼位于這兩種情況之間。
- 鋼鐵企業 /
- 余熱余壓發電 /
- 上網電價政策 /
- 定價策略 /
- 電力市場 /
- 經濟評價 /
- 斯坦克爾伯格博弈
Abstract: This study analyzes the feed-in tariff strategy of steel enterprises in the context of the steel industry’s electricity market, which is composed of waste heat and pressure (WHP) power generation and traditional thermal power generation. A Stackelberg game model was developed to compare three pricing strategies (i.e., fixed price, fixed premium, and variable premium) for the feed-in tariff of WHP power generation technology among steel enterprises, traditional fossil fuel power generators, and local governments. Three pricing strategies for WHP generation feed-in tariffs are compared, and numerical simulations are run to examine the effects of market size, WHP generation cost coefficients, and steel firm environmental costs on optimal regulated prices, optimal steel firm profits, and optimal total social welfare, respectively. The following findings are obtained. (1) For optimal price regulation, increasing the market size and the coefficient of WHP generation cost has little effect on the optimal price regulation under the fixed price policy. The only way to increase the price of the fixed price policy is to increase the environmental cost of steel enterprises. Moreover, increasing the market size and the coefficient of WHP generation cost will reduce the price of fixed premia. Additionally, increasing the market size and the coefficient of WHP generation cost will reduce the price of fixed premia. Increases in market size and WHP generation costs will raise the price of variable premium insurance, whereas increases in enterprise environmental costs will lower and maintain the price of variable premium policy. (2) For optimal steel enterprise profit, increasing the market size and the cost coefficient of WHP generation will increase the profit of steel enterprises under the fixed premium policy. However, it will have little effect on the profit of the fixed price and variable premium policies. Moreover, increasing the environmental cost of enterprises will reduce the profit of the fixed premium policy, but it will have little effect on the profit of the fixed price and variable premium policy. (3) For optimal total social welfare, increasing the market size and environmental cost of steel enterprises can increase total social welfare under the fixed price policy. Moreover, increasing the coefficient of WHP generation cost has little effect on the fixed price policy welfare; increasing both the market size and the coefficient of WHP generation cost has little effect on the fixed premium policy welfare. Additionally, increasing the environmental cost of enterprises can increase the fixed premium policy welfare, and increasing the market size can increase the total variable premium policy welfare. Meanwhile, increasing the coefficient of WHP generation cost and the environmental cost of steel enterprises can reduce the variable premium policy welfare and finally level off. (4) Depending on the decision maker’s preferences, various optimal decisions can be made. Higher subsidies imply higher optimal regulation prices, which are accompanied by market riskiness, thus influencing the rate of market development of waste heat and waste pressure power feed-in tariffs. In optimal rule prices, low riskiness and low subsidies are fixed price strategies, high riskiness and moderate subsidies are fixed premium strategies, and high riskiness and high subsidies are variable premium strategies. In optimal steel firm profit, low riskiness and low subsidy, high riskiness and high subsidy, and low riskiness and high subsidy are fixed price, fixed premium, and variable premium strategies, respectively. In optimal total social welfare, moderate riskiness and moderate subsidy, low riskiness and low subsidy, and high riskiness and high subsidy are fixed price, fixed premium, and variable premium strategies, respectively.
- steel enterprises /
- waste heat and residual pressure power generation /
- feed-in tariff strategy /
- pricing strategy /
- electricity market /
- economic evaluation /
- Stackelberg game

HTML全文

圖 1 鋼鐵企業A、化石燃料發電企業B與地方政府C的關系

Figure 1. Relationship between steel enterprise A, fossil fuel power generation enterprise B, and local government C

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 2 市場規模α對最優規制價格的影響

Figure 2. Effect of market scale α on optimal regulated prices

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 3 市場規模α對鋼鐵企業利潤的影響

Figure 3. Effect of market scale α on the profits of steel enterprises

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 4 市場規模對最優社會總福利的影響

Figure 4. Effect of market scale α on optimal total social welfare

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 5 余熱余壓發電成本系數d_A對最優規制價格的影響

Figure 5. Effect of the cost coefficient d_Aof waste heat and pressure power generation on optimal regulated prices

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 6 余熱余壓發電成本系數d_A對鋼鐵企業利潤的影響

Figure 6. Effect of the cost coefficient d_Aof waste heat and pressure power generation on the steel enterprises’ profits

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 7 余熱余壓發電成本系數d_A對最優社會福利的影響

Figure 7. Effect of the cost coefficient d_A of waste heat and pressure power generation on optimal total social welfare

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 8 鋼鐵企業環境成本SC對最優價格的影響

Figure 8. Effect of environmental cost SC for steel enterprises on optimal regulated prices

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 9 鋼鐵企業環境成本SC對鋼鐵企業利潤的影響

Figure 9. Effect of steel enterprises’ environmental costs on their profits

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 10 鋼鐵企業環境成本SC對社會總福利的影響

Figure 10. Effect of environmental cost SC for steel enterprises on optimal total social welfare

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

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